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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and recovery in quasi-contract.17 While the weight of authority seems
to follow the warranty theory,18 the Supreme Court was not required
to choose in the instant case, since the United States could recover
under either theory.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA OVERRULED
Petitioners, Jehovah's Witnesses, went from door to door soliciting
people to purchase religious books and pamphlets. The city of Jean-
nette, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint charging petitioners with failure
to obtain a license as required by an ordinance. The lower court
found them guilty and the Pennsylvania court of appeal affirmed
the decision. Held, the ordinance is invalid as abridging the free-
dom of religion. Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 63 Sup.
Ct. 870 (1943). (Justices Jackson [at p. 882], Frankfurter [at p.
899], Roberts [at p. 899], and Reed [at p. 891] dissenting).
The Constitution declares that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof." U.S. Const. Amend. I. These religious guaranties are
limitations only on the federal government and do not protect the
religious liberties of the people against state governments, unless the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes protection
of religious liberty. Willis, "Constitutional Law" (1936) 502. De-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court hold that such is the case.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); cf. Hamilton v. Regents of University
of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1935).
The tax imposed by the Jeannette city ordinance is a flat license
tax and is a condition precedent to the exercise of the constitutional
privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power
to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292
U.S. 40 (1934). Therefore, unless the Jeannette city ordinance can
1889); Bergam v. Avenue State Bank, 248 Ill. App. 516, 1 N.E.
(2d) 432 (1936); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Harriman Na-
tional Bank, 237 App. Div. 401, 262 N.Y. Supp. 483 (1932) ; General
Fire Assurance Co. v. State, 177 App. Div. 745, 164 N.Y. Supp.
871 (1917); Oriental Bank v. Gallo, 112 App. Div. 360, 98 N.Y.Supp.
561 (1906). Dean Ames has challenged this theory of recovery,
"The Doctrine of Price v. Neal" (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297.
See Kessler, "Forged Instruments" (1938) 47 Yale L.J. 873.
17. Recovery is allowed under this doctrine for mutual mistake of
fact as to the genuineness of the signature of the payee. United
States National Park Bank of New York, Fed. 852 (S.D. N.Y.
1881); First National Bank of Minnesota v. City National Bank
of Holyoke, 182 Mass. 130, 65 N.E. 24 (1902); Welch v. Goodwin,
123 Mass. 71, 25 Am. Rep. 24 (1878); Merchants National Bank
v. National Bank of Commonwealth, 139 Mass. 513, 2 N.E. 89(1885). Some courts use the terms, warranty and quasi-contract,
indiscriminately when allowing recovery and are not clear upon
which basis recovery is allowed. New York Produce Exchange
Bank v. 12th Ward Bank, 135 App. Div. 521, 19 N.Y. Supp. 988(1909); City Bank v. National Bank, 45 Texas 213 (1876).
18. See note 16 supra.
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be justified as a valid exercise of the police power or v.s a valid reg-
ulation of a commercial rather than a religious venture, it is repug-
nant to the privileges guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of
our Constitution.
"The police power is the legal capacity of sovereignty, or one
of its agents, to delimit personal liberty for the protection of other
more important social interests by means which bear a substantial
relation thereto." Willis, "Constitutional Law" (1936) 728. In
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 426 (1937),
the court appears to approve a proper use of the taxing power for
police power purposes. Thus, the inquiry resolves itself into the
question: Is this a proper exercise of the police power? In Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (and authorities there
cited), the court said, " . . . the Amendment [Fourteenth] embraces
two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Thus, the
court must decide the question by weighing the relative values of the
social interest in personal liberty as opposed to the .ocial interests
of society as a whole. Therefore, since this ordinance is not an at-
tempt to regulate petitioners for the protection of society, the court
seems justified in holding that it is not a proper exercise of the
police power.
Whether petitioner's acts constitute a commercial rather than a
religious venture is purely a question of fact. It would be a distor-
tion of the facts of record to say that petitioners were engaged in a
commercial venture. The Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Mead,
230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523 (1941) described the selling activities
of members of this same sect as "merely incidental and collateral" to
their "main object which was to preach and publicize the doctrines
of their order." Accord, State v. Meredith, 197 S.C. 351, 15 S.E. (2d)
678 (1941). Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Jones v. City of
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) at p. 620 said, "The exercise, without
commercial motives of freedom of speech, freedom of press, or free-
dom of worship are not proper sources of taxation for general reve-
nue purposes." The license tax of seven dollars a week is clearly
not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the
expenses of policing the activities in question. Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941). Also such tax is not levied to safe-
guard the people against the evils of solicitation. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). This ordinance levies a tax specifically
on the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore is
unconstitutional. For a discussion of Jones v. City of Opelika, see
(1942) 17 Ind. L. J. 555.
CONTRACTS
AGREEMENT TO REPURCHASE-CORRECTION
The third line on page 248 of the April, 1943 JOURNAL (18 Ind.
L.J.) should be corrected to read as follows: "Held, for the plaintiff.
Haworth v. Hubbard, - Ind. - , 44 N.E. (2d) 967 (1942) ."
